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GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
VoLumE 21 SPEcIAL IssuE 1986 NtumEm I
CONGRESS: THE PURSE, THE PURPOSE, AND
THE POWER
Abner J. Mikva*
The first amendment to the Constitution, Justice Hugo Black
once said, was first by design, and not by happenstance; its place-
ment signified that to the country's founders, the freedoms of speech
and press and religion were of primary concern. So too article I
of the Constitution, establishing the Congress of the United States,
was first by design rather than by happenstance; its placement
reflects the founders' intent and expectation that Congress would
be the dominant branch.
To ensure that Congress would act as the first branch of gov-
ernment, the constitutional framers gave the legislature virtually
exclusive power to control the nation's purse strings. Even then,
when the nation's purse was small and the amounts in question
meager, experienced participants in government knew that the power
of the purse was the most far-reaching and effectual of all gov-
ernmental powers. This power the Framers chose to lodge in Con-
gress. Doubtless they knew that granting the power of the purse
to Congress would have costs. Doubtless they understood that a
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collection of diverse individuals representing diverse interests (and
divided into separate chambers as well) would less efficiently and
less coherently devise fiscal policy than would a single "treasurer"
or "fiscal czar." Yet they chose, for good reason, to suffer this
cost and bear its risks. And in so choosing, they laid down a
principle of government no less grand, although apparently more
prosaic, than any other in the Constitution: the government works
best-works in the most desirable, balanced, and responsive way-
when the power of the purse lies in the hands of the Congress.
Throughout our history, numerous events have threatened this prin-
ciple. Often the President has invoked the need for efficiency and
sought to reorder the constitutional allocation of power; sometimes
Congress itself has done so. Yet the principle has survived and will
continue to do so as long as we-judges, lawyers, and citizens
alike-recognize its profound importance to our nation.
My statement that the Framers intended Congress to act as the
primary governmental branch may be shocking. Most of us learned
in our elementary school days that the Constitution established
three branches of government with separate, distinct, and roughly
equal powers. This well-known doctrine of separation of powers
was popularized by Baron de Montesquieu in his treatise Spirit of
the Laws.' He claimed that tyranny could best be avoided by pre-
venting the accumulation of all powers-legislative, executive, and
judicial-in the same hands. The chief proponents of the Consti-
tution, during the debate over its adoption, relied on the celebrated
Montesquieu doctrine to justify the need for the constitutional dis-
tribution of power among three branches. They argued that the
separation of powers-under which Congress would manage the
purse, the President would wield the sword, and the courts would
exercise the power of review-would protect individual liberties in
the newly formed federal government. Ambition would counteract
ambition, and those who administered each branch would have the
"necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist en-
croachment of the others." ' 2
Yet the Framers never expected and no doubt never intended
that the three governmental branches would be truly equal. The
initial popularity of Baron de Montesquieu's doctrine on these shores
derived largely from the colonists' desire to establish an independ-
ent, self-sufficient, and powerful legislative branch. And even when
the broader implications of that doctrine came to be understood
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and embraced, the belief remained that the legislative branch would
be the first among equals-that it would lead and guide the nation
more powerfully than either the executive or the judiciary could.
As James Madison wrote in one of the Federalist Papers, the leg-
islature would "necessarily ... predominate." 3
The decision of the Framers to grant Congress the power of the
purse reflected their belief that a proper governmental system would
have the legislature at its core. The Framers understood the signif-
icance of the fiscal power. Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Fed-
eralist Papers that "[m]oney is, with propriety, considered as the
vital principle of the body politic, as that which sustains its life
and motion, and enables it to perform its most important func-
tions. ' 4 James Madison added that the power of the purse is the
"most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution
can arm" a governmental branch.5 This weapon article I of the
Constitution placed squarely in the hands of Congress. Article I,
section 8 gave Congress the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises." Article I, section 9 stated that "[n]o money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appro-
priations made by law." The effect of these provisions, in line with
the intent of those who wrote them, was to give plenary power
over the nation's purse strings to Congress. It is true that a move-
ment to make the Secretary of the Treasury directly accountable
to Congress instead of to the President ultimately went down to
defeat. 6 But the very strength of this movement serves to under-
score the Framers' deep commitment to ensuring the fiscal prerog-
atives of Congress. Their intent, as James Madison wrote in the
Federalist Papers, was to guarantee that "the legislative department
alone has access to the pockets of the people." '7
The value of granting Congress plenary power over fiscal matters
is no less and perhaps even more clear today than it was in 1789.
First, decisions regarding taxation and expenditure should be made
in our most representative of institutions. Roger Sherman said at
the Constitutional Convention that "[iun making laws regard should
be had to the sense of the people who are to be bound by them,
and it is more probable that a single man should mistake or betray
this sense than the legislature." ' 8 In no context are Sherman's words
more true than in the context of fiscal policy. The justice, the
reasonableness, even the efficacy of fiscal decisions depend upon
the government's having taken into account the diverse interests of
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its citizens. No institution is more willing-no institution is better
able-to consider and accomodate these interests than the legislative
branch. The Framers' decision to give budgetary power to Congress
rested largely on this view. Indeed, the Framers chose to delegate
only to the House-the chamber most closely connected to the
electorate-the right to initiate revenue bills. Clearly, the Framers
believed that decisions directly affecting the pocketbooks of our
people should be made by the governmental institution that is clos-
est to them.
Perhaps even more important, Congress' power over the purse is
today a necessary precondition of a balanced governmental system.
As I have already suggested, the Framers contemplated that the
legislature would tower above the other two branches. And Con-
gress lived up to these expectations for many years. In the early
nineteenth century, French historian Alexis de Tocqueville wrote
that the "[s]truggle between President and legislature is bound to
be unequal for the latter, if it sticks to its plan, is always able to
overcome any resistance he can put up." 9 Almost a century later,
a then unknown political scientist at Princeton University, looking
with despair at the seemingly impotent executive branch, argued
that Congress was predominant "over its so-called coordinate
branches."' 0 Woodrow Wilson concluded that the vast array of
powers Congress possessed under the Constitution made it "the
dominant, nay, the irresistible power of the federal system, rele-
gating some of the chief balances of the Constitution to an insig-
nificant role in the 'literary theory' of our institutions."' But since
the scholar Wilson wrote those words, the balance of power has
notably shifted. The growth and increasing complexity of govern-
ment, the frequency, scale, and terror of modern war, and the
emergence of the mass media have transformed the role and power
of the executive branch. In this new and very different political
world, Congress' control over the nation's purse strings has become
even more critical than before.
I am reminded here of the close, in the mid-1970's, of the Viet-
nam War. For years-arguably, for decades-Congress abdicated
its responsibility to resist this costly and futile foreign venture. But
when the legislature finally became convinced that the war in Viet-
nam had to stop, it worked its will through its budgetary power.
In 1974 and again in 1975, Congress refused to appropriate the
more than one-half billion dollars requested by the President to
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continue the war effort. The denial effectively forced the cessation
of hostilities; Congress had seized the initiative in exactly the man-
ner contemplated by the founders. Had Congress not possessed this
plenary power-had the President retained any authority to raise,
appropriate, or divert funds-this catastrophic war would certainly
have continued. For the source of almost all congressional power-
the spine and bite of legislative authority-lies in Congress' control
of the nation's purse. If ever Congress loosens its hold on this
source of power or if ever the President wrests it away, then, to
quote the late Senator Frank Church, "the American Republic will
go the way of Rome.' ' 2 The delicate balance created by the Fra-
mers will have been destroyed.
I do not mean to minimize or ignore the costs associated with
congressional control over the national budget. In the real world-
or, at the very least, in the world of government-free lunches are
few and far between. Even at its best, budgetary control by the
Congress is often an unwieldy and awkward process. To some
extent, the difficulties of congressional action in this sphere simply
mirror the difficulties of congressional action in any other. The
very traits that make the American Congress so representative also
make it less than perfectly efficient. In criticizing the notion of a
bicameral legislature, Benjamin Franklin used a well-known parable:
Has not the famous political fable of the snake with two
heads and one body some useful instruction in it? She
was going to a brook to drink and, on her way, was to
pass through a hedge, a twig of which opposed her direct
course; one head chose to go on the right side of the
hedge, the other on the left; so that time was spent in
the contest, and before the decision was completed, the
poor snake died of thirst. 3
Franklin, of course, had simplified the problem. For the snake has
not two heads, but hundreds. In the House of Representatives, 435
men and women, representing a wide variety €of political consti-
tuencies and subscribing to a wide variety of political views, strug-
gle each day for advantage. In the Senate, the number of
representatives is smaller, but the power of each to delay and block
the passage of legislation is vast. Concerted and effective action in
each chamber, and in both chambers combined, is of course pos-
sible. When the congressional party is strong, when congressional
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leadership is effective, and when congressional procedures are con-
ducive to orderly and coherent decisionmaking, conflict may sub-
side and a consensus emerge such that Congress can act with
decision and dispatch. But the obstacles to effective congressional
action are significant, and no commentator on (or participant in)
the political process can afford to understate them.
Moreover, the hurdles that stand in the way of legislative effec-
tiveness are at their highest when Congress attempts to make fiscal
decisions. The special difficulties in this context arise first from the
importance and potential impact of the decisions themselves. Every
citizen cares about the size of his tax bill; every citizen wishes to
reap the benefits-and, perhaps unfortunately, to avoid the costs-
of governmental spending. The depth and breadth of public con-
cern in this sphere is itself one reason for placing control over
fiscal matters in the hands of Congress, the body closest and most
responsive to the people. But this same public concern increases
the difficulty of concerted and judicious congressional action. In
this sphere, as in hardly any other, each representative is subject
to intense-and usually conflicting-public pressures. Compounding
these pressures is the elusiveness and complexity of the subject
matter itself. When David Stockman, then the director of the Of-
fice of Management and Budget, said in 1981 that "[n]one of us
really understands what's going on with all these numbers,' 1 4 he
spoke no more than the simple truth. Of course, this problem does
not afflict the legislative branch alone; remember that it was Stock-
man, the supposed wizard of the executive office, who made this
somewhat bizarre admission. But it cannot be gainsaid that to ask
535 men and women, most of whom have no expertise in the area
and all of whom are subject to parochial pressures, to agree on
wise and judicious budgetary measures is to ask an extraordinarily
difficult thing.
The appropriate response to these difficulties, however, is not to
cede budgetary power to the executive branch, but to improve Con-
gress' own budgetary procedures. No set of procedures will elimi-
nate all of the stumbling blocks to decisive and effective action by
Congress in the fiscal sphere; many of these blocks are inherent in
the nature of the institution and the nature of the policy field
involved. But Congress can work to mitigate the inefficiencies and
inadequacies of the current budgetmaking process. This solution
appears somewhat unexciting; what is worse, it may appear illusory.
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History, however, suggests otherwise. Notwithstanding the various
obstacles to effective congressional budgeting that I have discussed,
Congress has in fact substantially increased its capacity to develop
responsible fiscal policy. The history of the past ten or twelve years
suggests that efficacious internal reform of Congress' budgetmaking
procedures is not a fool's dream, but an eminently reasonable as-
piration. I make this claim even at a time when tax cuts, military
spending, and high interest rates have combined to give this nation
its largest budget deficit ever.
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
197415 is of course the best example of a congressional reform
measure that has heightened Congress' ability to perform its budg-
etmaking tasks. Prior to the Budget Act of 1974, Congress had no
procedures to equate the spending and revenue sides of the national
budget. Unlike in even the smallest business or household, no one
was responsible for the so-called bottom line. The Appropriations
Committee spent, the revenue committees taxed, but no mechanism
was available to assess the continued impact of spending and taxing
on budget surpluses or deficits. Without such a mechanism, Con-
gress was understandably unable to formulate sensible fiscal policy.
And because Congress was itself unable to develop a total budg-
etary policy, it became highly dependent on the executive branch's
fiscal policy proposals.
The Budget Act of 1974 gave Congress, for the first time, the
tools necessary to establish some control over the national budget.
The Act created two budget committees, one in each chamber,
which were given the responsibility to develop coordinated budget
proposals for the consideration of the entire House and Senate.
The Act further established a timetable governing the development,
presentation, amendment, and enactment of these budget proposals.
Finally, the Budget Act created the Congressional Budget Office,
which was designed to give Congress support in economic and
budgetary matters by collecting economic data and providing tech-
nical expertise. Taken together, these provisions effected nothing
less than a revolution in the way Congress controls the nation's
purse strings. The new process allows members of the Congress to
examine the budget as a whole document. No longer do several
committees work separately on different aspects of expenditure and
taxation without relating or comparing their efforts. This increased
coordination allows Congress to plan fiscal policy, to conduct a
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sensible debate on national priorities, and, if it so chooses, to resist
the executive branch's proposals concerning expenditures and tax-
ation. In 1976, Brock Adams, then the Chairman of the House
Budget Committee, assessed the final budget resolution of the fiscal
year 1977 and commented that "perhaps (its] most important aspect
... is the fact that it contains the budget of Congress and not
that of the President.' ' 6 The statement pinpoints what is the most
important aspect of the Budget Act of 1974: it allowed Congress
to regain effective control over the nation's budget, as the Framers
had intended and as our constitutional system demands.
Of course, the congressional budgetary process continues to show
some major flaws. The Budget Act has not completely prevented
Congress from indeliberately accepting the President's fiscal policy
proposals. In 1981, for example, the House and Senate leadership
used action-forcing mechanisms to divert Congress from the route
anticipated by the Budget Act and to compel precipitate decisions
on each important element of the President's program for fiscal
year 1982. Minnesota Congressman William Frenzel not long after-
ward objected that "[wie have been voting for ghosts and shadows,
based on moonbeam, smoke and rainbow dust. What we are wit-
nessing is a deterioration of the budget process.' 7 Regardless of
the quality of the executive proposals at issue, Congressman Fren-
zel's evaluation of the budgetary process appears correct. The Budget
Act as enacted in 1974 was designed to be a deliberate, thoughtful
process in which committees of expertise would maintain their le-
verage over the programs with which they were familiar. The Budget
Act as acted upon in 1981 forced decisions on all of the major
budget proposals before serious analysis of the President's program
was possible. From one perspective, Congress responded effectively
to a perceived national mandate. On the other hand, such an ex-
peditious implementation of major social change can be dangerous.
The Congress was not intended to be a quick-hit institution, but
rather an institution of careful deliberation. George Washington,
for example, believed that the Senate should be the "saucer" in
which the coffee cools. This role appears as important in budgetary
matters as elsewhere. By acting as it did in 1981, Congress abdi-
cated its responsibility to keep tight control of the nation's purse
strings, and the Budget Act of 1974 did nothing to prevent this.
On the other hand, the budget process in some years arguably
has consumed far too much congressional time. The whole body
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of legislative procedure by which congressional financial decisions
are now made is extremely cumbersome. Theoretically, Congress is
to pass each year two budget resolutions, thirteen appropriation
bills, one reconciliation bill, and perhaps revenue-raising legislation.
Three major committees-Budget, Appropriations, and Taxation-
are involved in each decision, not to mention each authorizing
committee with respect to its own programs. Because of the com-
plexities of the subject matter and the strong passions generated by
it, Congress often takes a great deal of time to jump through this
set of legislative hoops. In these years, the federal purse strings
have threatened to strangle congressional initiative.
Finally, the Budget Act appears to have had little effect in curb-
ing federal spending. This country's spending levels may not pose
quite the danger that some people believe they do. Expenditure
bills bear only a portion of the responsibility for the federal debt:
the nation's tax code bears the rest. And even the federal debt
may not be a harbinger of doom; although the sheer size of the
debt seems monstrous, the ratio of debt to income is today one-
sixth of the size that it was in 1789.18 Still, the reduction of federal
spending is a goal to which most Americans will subscribe. And
that goal spurred congressional enactment of the Budget Act of
1974. Many members of Congress initially believed that adoption
of the new procedures would work to cut federal spending, or at
least to slow its increase. They believed that the haphazard methods
of the past were responsible for the rate of federal spending and
that when representatives became able to view the budget in its
entirety, the growth of spending would naturally cease. But the
Budget Act has failed to accomplish this objective. Some, it is
true, have argued that Congress would have spent even more money
and created an even larger deficit absent the complex procedures
of the Budget Act. And some support for this claim does exist:
compare the 53 billion dollar deficit of fiscal year 1977, when
Congress followed carefully the Budget Act's procedures, with the
128 billion dollar deficit of fiscal year 1982, when Congress dis-
missed those procedures from its mind.19 But others have insisted
that the Budget Act's procedures are themselves partly responsible
for the continued growth of federal spending. They maintain, for
example, that in order to attract sufficient votes to pass their budget
resolutions, the Budget Committees often must accomodate spend-
ing interests that have been rebuffed by authorization and appro-
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priations committees. In the end, the Budget Act probably has had
little effect in either direction. If Congress wishes to curb federal
spending dramatically, it will probably have to take some other
action.
Congress, of course, attempted to take such action when it passed
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act,20 more
popularly known as Gramm-Rudman. This Act, like the Budget
Act of 1974, should properly be viewed as an effort by Congress
to control and discipline its own budgetary processes. The decision
to set a maximum deficit amount for federal spending and to
require across-the-board cuts in such spending to reach the targeted
deficit level can be attacked as substantively misguided. But Con-
gress' passage of the Act at least demonstrated a determination to
retain control over its constitutional domain and an effort to ex-
ercise that control in a responsible way. Ironically, Congress over-
stepped its own bounds in attempting to impose self-discipline on
its fiscal activities: the Supreme Court recently held that the powers
vested in the Comptroller General by the Act violated the Consti-
tution's command that Congress play no direct role in the execution
of the laws. 21 The decision effectively scrapped the Gramm-Rudman
plan, but the legislators will probably agree at some point on a
proposal to take its place. As is appropriate, Congress appears
ready to consider with some earnestness plans to rationalize and
discipline Congress' use of its fiscal powers.
The Budget Act of 1974 and the Gramm-Rudman Act represent
but two legislative efforts to impose some order on Congress' budg-
etary activities. There are other examples as well. The public debt
ceiling is a congressional attempt, albeit not a very successful one,
to control the outcomes of Congress' fiscal processes. The original
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 22 although eventually leading
to greatly increased executive power, began as an attempt to help
the Congress order its budget activities. Finally, the creation of the
General Accounting Office23 under the control of the Congress sig-
nified a legislative desire to keep a close watch on fiscal affairs.
Some of these attempts to order Congress' fiscal processes have
proved less successful than their sponsors might have hoped. But
taken together, they show that Congress can act to amend and
improve its budgetary processes and that some such measures will
meet with success.
What is perhaps even more important, however, is that the Con-
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stitution's grant of fiscal power to Congress is not contingent upon
such success. The recent Gramm-Rudman decision serves to support
this point. Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court: "No one can
doubt that Congiess and the President are confronted with fiscal
and economic problems of unprecedented magnitude, but 'the fact
that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful
in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not
save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and effi-
ciency are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of dem-
ocratic government. "'24 The Court, in the Gramm-Rudman case,
was speaking to the legislature. But the point could be made to
the executive as well. No matter how inefficient, how incoherent,
or how confused congressional action on the budget may sometimes
seem, the power of the purse belongs to the legislative and not to
the executive branch.
This was the principle Richard Nixon ignored when he asserted
as "absolutely clear" his right to impound congressionally appro-
priated funds.2 Impoundments had occurred in American history
before. President Jefferson impounded $50,000 that Congress had
appropriated for the construction of a frigate on the ground that
a "favorable and peaceable turn of affairs on the Mississippi" had
rendered the war ship unnecessary.26 President Roosevelt impounded
monies that Congress had appropriated for public works in an
effort to keep funds available for the war effort. And Presidents
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson also occasionally re-
sorted to impoundment in order to meet their own policy objec-
tives. Not until Richard Nixon's presidency, however, did the
dangers of impoundment become "absolutely clear." According to
the Nixon administration's own calculations, it had impounded or
delayed expenditure of funds totaling over 11.8 billion dollars. The
administration's figures, however, failed to include some six billion
dollars appropriated by the Federal Water Pollution Prevention and
Control Act; 27 the actual amount of funds withheld thus ap-
proached eighteen billion dollars.
The Nixon administration used a variety of arguments to explain
its impoundment of legislative appropriations that exceeded the
President's budgetary requests. Most frequently, President Nixon
simply pointed to evidence of fiscal irresponsibility by Congress. If
the legislators could not do their job, he suggested, then the Pres-
ident could do it for them. Sometimes, the Nixon administration
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buttressed this claim with arguments that had a more legal ring.
Then Deputy Attorney General Sneed, for example, testified that
"[tihe exercise of [the impoundment] authority by the President to
promote fiscal stability ... is in the great tradition of checks and
balances upon which our Constitution is based." ' 28 Attorney General
Richard Kleindienst and Office of Management and Budget Deputy
Director Casper Weinberger claimed that the power to impound
funds was implicit in the provisions of article II, which endows
the President with executive authority. 29 A somewhat more limited
argument posited that when the President's budget contained a
request to rescind certain funds, he need not spend those funds
until Congress had had an opportunity to consider his request.
Finally, the Nixon administration contended that, in general, an
appropriations bill was merely an authorization to spend, setting
an upper but not a lower limit.
Neither the courts nor Congress was much impressed. Most of
the Nixon administration's impoundments reached the courts, and
in that forum the administration suffered virtually complete defeat.
By 1974, the plaintiffs had overturned impoundments in more than
fifty cases, whereas the courts had upheld the President in only
four. One case concerning impoundment, Train v. City of New
York,3° reached the Supreme Court. In 1975, the Court decided
that the Clean Water Act, notwithstanding ambiguities in its lan-
guage and legislative history, did not permit the President to with-
hold any of the funds provided by Congress.3 1 Although the decision
turned essentially on issues of statutory interpretation, the opinion
underscored the important constitutional principles involved-most
notably, the authority of Congress to mandate spending and the
responsibility of the President to carry out the laws.
Meanwhile, Congress responded to the threat that the impound-
ments posed to its fiscal authority. Title X of the Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 established a set of procedures
to govern all presidential efforts to withhold funds. The title re-
quired that the President submit a special message to Congress
whenever he proposed to withhold appropriated monies. A proposal
to rescind funds-that is, to eliminate funding completely-required
the approval of each house of Congress within forty-five days. A
proposal to defer the expenditure of funds to another year re-
mained in effect unless disapproved by either house. At approxi-
mately the same time, the House Judiciary Committee seriously
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considered, but ultimately rejected, a proposal to list President Nix-
on's impoundment policies as one of the grounds for his impeach-
ment.
The response of the courts and Congress was clearly proper in
light of the nature of the executive action involved. To the extent
that the President can impound congressionally appropriated funds,
he is able to deny Congress power to fulfill its constitutional re-
sponsibilities. As the House Report to the Impoundment Control
Act stated, "legislative decisions have no meaning if they can be
unilaterally abrogated by executive impoundments."3 2 The Consti-
tution, of course, grants to the President the responsibility and
authority to execute the laws. But this provision defeats rather than
supports the case for impoundment. An appropriations act consti-
tutes a law that the President must faithfully execute. And as the
Supreme Court wrote in Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,
3
"[tlo contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see
the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their exe-
cution, is a novel construction of the constitution and entirely in-
admissible." 34 The Constitution does not require that the President
be a mere clerk, and his power to execute the laws must necessarily
involve some discretion. But to imply from this discretion a power
as great as impoundment is to allow the exception to swallow the
rule and to ignore the basic tenor of the Constitution.
The denial of the power to impound hardly renders the executive
impotent in the budgetary process. The President may (and invar-
iably does) present a comprehensive set of budget proposals to
Congress. He may use his position as leader of the party to try to
push these proposals through the legislative body. He may use his
unparalleled access to the media-his "bully pulpit," so to speak-
to sway the public's mind and thus to force Congress' hand. And
he may veto, subject to congressional override, any piece of leg-
islation that he believes inconsistent with the public good. The
President may not, however, take upon himself any other or ad-
ditional powers. When he does so, he flouts the intent of the
Framers that Congress control the power of the purse. He upsets
the delicate compromises and intricate bargains that form the heart
of the legislative process. And he subverts the role and function
of Congress within our carefully balanced constitutional structure.
The same dangers lurk in any decision by Congress to hand over
powers to the executive branch. Throughout our history, both Pres-
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idents and members of Congress have proposed that Congress yield
some significant part of its budgetary authority to the executive
office. On occasion, these proposals have urged nothing less than
an executive budget. During the debate on the Budget and Ac-
counting Act of 1921, for example, a serious attempt was made to
institute such a budget.35 Although the alternative proposals differed
in detail, most required a two-thirds majority vote for the passage
of any expenditure to which the President objected. One proposal
allowed Congress to increase the amounts requested in the Presi-
dent's budget only by means of separate legislation, thus subjecting
each budgetary increase to the President's veto power. This pro-
posal differs little from another frequently urged amendment to
our governmental system-the line item veto. Since 1873, when
Ulysses Grant first proposed the idea, over 150 legislative proposals
have called for Congress to give to the President the ability to veto
individual parts of a bill. Congress has thus far rejected such pro-
posals; with any luck, it always will.
For regardless of whether Congress yields budgetary authority or
the President usurps it, the threat to our constitutional order is the
same. In our governmental system, the legislature does and must
have plenary power over the budget. The power of the purse is
the strength of the Congress; take that away, and all else will fall.
Is Congress' management of the budget inefficient? Surely it is;
the workings of democratic institutions always are. Is it cumber-
some? Of course it is; getting a majority of 535 political prima
donnas to agree on anything is a difficult task. But if we wish to
live in a pluralistic and free society, we will strive to ensure that
Congress retains exclusive control of the nation's purse. Only in
that event will the delicate balance of our constitutional structure
be preserved.
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